
Ray McSharry and the Section 23 Timebomb
It’s a godsend for the wealthy, a real haven.”
In March 1988 Ray McSharry reintroduced section twenty-three tax relief on rental properties. It was listed under section twenty-seven of the Finance Act but retained its name from 1981, when it was first introduced as a stimulus for investment in construction.
The Irish Times reported that the government’s decision to bring back the section provided a ‘tax efficient outlet for investors and a valuable shelter for people with existing rental income.’ The maximum relief available was essentially the purchase price of the property less the cost of the site.
The scheme was announced as a short-term measure to help what was seen as a flagging construction industry, and was due to run from the twenty-seventh of January 1988 to the thirty-first of March 1991, but was extended by various finance ministers throughout the 1990s and current decade. It allowed investors to construct and/or purchase flats and town houses, with a floor area of no more than ninety square metres each, in designated areas in towns and cities – including large sections of central Dublin - and to offset construction costs and rental income against income tax.
Its main purpose, however, was not to provide housing or rental accommodation. The reason for the scheme was to provide tax relief for investors. The fact that this was done via construction should not disguise the fact that this was a legal procedure for the avoidance of tax.
The scheme was not exclusive to the income from the rental property in question. The exemptions went to the company or individual who availed of the scheme, and the building costs were offset against all of the client’s existing rental income, subject to the maximum relief allowable.
Investors were able ‘to obtain tax-free rental income from the new units they buy and from any other new or old property they own (or subsequently may buy in the State) whether it is commercial, industrial or residential, until all the relief is used up.’ The tax allowances meant that as a financial investment, property could provide ‘gross return [of] around seventeen per cent, with the additional attraction of a potential capital gain over ten years.’
Property, once again, was providing a tax shelter for investors, and not surprisingly, investors responded with energy and enthusiasm.
For their part, builders almost immediately increased the price of properties ‘with the tax relief in mind in much the same way that first-time buyer housing grants were previously absorbed.’ A property and price boom had begun, fuelled not by wider economic activity within the State – that is, by wages, employment and demand from below - but by investors looking for tax relief and seemingly safe investments.
By the end of 1988 the newspapers were reporting a twenty-four per cent increase in building starts in Dublin, while in Galway the increase stood at over fifty per cent. During the months of September and October around twenty million pounds’ worth of new homes were sold, and according to one Dublin auctioneer, ‘a healthy chunk of that was sold to investors availing of the tax advantages contained in section twenty-three (now section twenty-seven).’
The fact that investment, not jobs and wages, was driving demand could be seen by the nature of the sales.
The Irish Times found that prices at the lower end of the housing market remained ‘all but unchanged with the middle and upper areas deriving the greatest benefit from the boom,’ and that around sixty to seventy per cent of all sales of new homes in the affluent areas of Dublin Four and Dublin Six were to investors under the Section Twenty Three tax relief scheme.
The nature of the late 1980s property boom – its subsidy by government incentives via mortgage grants and the creation of tax havens – was of particular concern to the governor of the Central Bank of Ireland, Mr. Maurice Doyle.
In November 1988 he gave a speech at the annual dinner of the Master Builders Association where he pointed out the dangers of Section Twenty Three concessions, mortgage interest relief, subsidised local authority housing, and first-time buyer grants.
‘The arguments for so much subsidisation – direct and indirect – of the housing market, which looked reasonable at a time of free-spending high inflation, high marriage and birth rates, high interest rates and domestic rate charges’ he said, ´looks rather different against a background of belt-tightening all round, low interest rates, low household formation and no rates.’
In May 1989 the journalist Maev Ann Wren argued that ‘the flow of money into house purchase may be limiting funds for other more productive purposes.’ She pointed out that in 1988 ‘financial institutions lent nearly £300 million more to home owners than two years previously… At the same time the amount of money being invested in new machinery and equipment for productive purposes grew by just over £200 million.’
Wren noted that while government borrowing was down, personal borrowing by way of mortgage debt was increasing. Not only that, the rise in house prices gave home-owners the feeling that they were wealthier as a result.
‘The financial institutions regard [this “wealth effect”] as real,’ she said. ‘They are prepared to offer people new higher mortgages on their homes to finance spending on other things, and in this way the rise in house prices might be passed on in a rise in other prices.
However, none of this “wealth effect” was down to actual productive economic expansion, but to the influx of speculative capital into the housing market via incentives such as Section Twenty Three, mortgage relief, and first-time buyer grants.
The overall rise in property was seen by banks and building societies as a way to increase borrowing, as people were encouraged to “realise” this new-found wealth via mortgage top-ups or moving home. And with little by way of jobs growth or wage increases, the higher mortgages and house prices were justified by the argument that a house purchase was an investment.
Wren was describing the formation of a bubble. She concluded that unless action was taken to deflate the “wealth effect” - by a property tax, for example, which would serve to remind people that property price increases are a cost to the economy, not a boon - Ireland was in danger of substituting its government debt crisis for a personal debt crisis.
Over the next twelve years, Wren’s concerns would come to fruition.

An Irish Times Article on Section 23
Discussion
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Comment by: Mark Coughlan
Oct 19th 2010 at 00:10
Really good and clear explanatory piece Conor. Enjoyed it.
Comment by: Conor McCabe
Oct 19th 2010 at 00:10
Thanks Mark. If you have access to the Irish Times archive, it’s well worth having a search for Maev Ann Wren’s articles on housing, going back to the 1980s. Really, she’s great and she understands the economic reasons why fuelling property speculation in Ireland in the 1980s and 1990s is going to lead to disaster.
I have one article from her from I think 1994 where she just debunks the whole “Irish obsession with property” myth, pointing out that as recently as 1961 seventy-five per cent of all urban dwellers rented. And she knows that money put into housing and property speculation is money taken away from productive growth - the type of growth, indigenous industrial export-led growth, that Ireland so desperately needed to break out of the structural weaknesses of its economy.
She moved into health studies, of course, but her work on housing is really worth checking out.
Comment by: Tom O\'Connor
Oct 19th 2010 at 16:10
Excellent assessment from the archives Conor. Good to talk to you at greaves.
All the best,
Tom.
Comment by: Conor McCabe
Oct 19th 2010 at 16:10
Thanks Tom. It’s from a chapter on housing from a book I’m working on, hopefully it’ll be out next March. No exaggeration to say that any time I come up from digging around in the economic history of Ireland I feel the need to shower with iodine. The scams, the blatant theft and corruption, it gets under your nails and you just feel caked with dirt, it is so repulsive.