Developing of the Tale of the Tiger: Ireland and the IMF

, , Comment closed

47 Flares Twitter 0 Facebook 47 47 Flares ×
Print pagePDF pageEmail page

Sophie Reynolds asks, can the IMF’s intervention be viewed as an attempt to preserve the institution’s continued claim to legitimacy?

The paradox of the hot bath is symmetrical: it draws the blood to the periphery, as well as the humors, perspiration, and all liquids, useful or harmful. Thus the vital centers are relieved; the heart now must function slowly; and the organism is thereby cooled.

(Foucault 1961 [1965: 169–70])

The following essay is an attempt to answer a question of critical importance to the history of the Irish State’s development; Namely, in light of the IMF’s recent disciplinary stance toward the Irish State, and in consideration of the key role played by a number of inter- and supra-national financial institutes in stimulating Ireland’s period of unprecedented economic growth, can the IMF’s stance in the post-crisis period be deemed an attempt to legitimise the institute’s technocratic claims to authority; and what are the implications of Ireland’s bailout within the wider context of Europe.

The essay will be two-pronged in its approach; in the first section, we will seek to offer a revisionist interpretation of the negative consequences of Ireland’s economic growth having been characterised largely by external exigencies. Ireland of the Celtic Tiger era was heralded as a “successful model for small and peripheral states in this era of globalization.”[1] The factors culminating in its dramatic demise thus merit closer attention within the wider context of development (or indeed post-development) studies.

In the latter section, we will seek to contemporise the discussion by focusing on the EU-IMF bailout in 2010. Here we will attempt to offer a political economic approach to the IMF’s intervention and authoritarian stance in Ireland, by contrasting the Fund’s economic surveys prior to and following the financial crisis. We will offer two readings of this: first, we will consider if the Fund’s authoritarian stance can be read as part of the institution’s bid to continued legitimacy– in its failure to prevent the crisis, and in light of its crisis of legitimacy prior to this.[2] Secondly, we will consider how the Fund’s stance toward Ireland relates to its roles as part of a wider international economic system, acknowledging that the IMF and the World Bank function as “twin intergovernmental pillars supporting the structure of the world’s economic and financial order.”[3] In so doing, we will seek to offer an alternative reading to the “sovereign” debt crisis.

Our arguments here will be theoretically underpinned by Wallerstein’s ‘world-systems analysis’, which adequately captures the interconnectedness of the capital of nation-states in the European and international economy, as well as the operations of “unequal-exchange” whereby the surplus-value of both peripheral areas and of the whole world-economy are appropriated by core areas.

The Problematics of the ‘Irish Problem’?

There has been a tendency in the literature outlining Ireland’s economic recession to focus very much on the culpability and failure of Irish policies that led up to 2008 financial crisis.[4] By reducing the issue to one of mere national magnitude, we fail to recognise the increasing influence that international institutions (financial and otherwise), as well as market forces have had on Irish economic policies. To borrow from the phrase by Kenneth Rogoff, Economic Counsellor at the International Monetary Fund, such a “critique confuses correlation with causation”[5]—admittedly the context within which this phrase was used was one of fatalistic defence of the IMF’s austerity policies. Importantly in this regard, Taylor argues that causality is not a matter of simply observing ’cause and effect” but consists of identifying how key mechanisms inherent in the world economy are worked out in particular contexts.[6] As such this essay will seek to address this perceived tendency to focus on the IMF’s intervention in Ireland as a particularly Irish problem, and situate the Irish economic crisis within a more global political economic context. In understanding the key mechanisms of the Irish ‘sovereign’ debt crisis it is important to consider Ireland’s economic development versus its economic growth – with the argument that through the policies enacted in conditional loans, the Irish state functioned as an ideal internal periphery within Europe [7] — a term that has been hollowed of some of its more pejorative connotations to suggest geographical location.

Speaking of the capitalist project, Wallerstein writes,

By a series of accidents – historical, ecological, geographic – northwest Europe was better situated in the sixteenth century to diversify its agricultural specialization and add to it certain industries (such as textiles, shipbuilding, and metal wares) than were other parts of Europe. Northwest Europe emerged as the core area of this world-economy, specializing in agricultural production of higher skill levels, which favored (again for reasons too complex to develop) tenancy and wage labor as the modes of labor control. Eastern Europe and the Western Hemisphere became peripheral areas specializing in export of grains, bullion, wood, cotton, sugar – all of which favored the use of slavery and coerced cash-crop labor as the modes of labor control. Mediterranean Europe emerged as the semiperipheral area of this world-economy specializing in high-cost industrial products … ‘(Wallerstein 1979 [2000: 199])

Wallerstein continues, “Capitalism was from the beginning an affair of the world-economy and not the nation-state… capital has never allowed its aspirations to be determined by national boundaries in a capitalist world-economy, and in the creation of “national” barriers, ‘generically, mercantilism – has historically been a defensive mechanism of capitalists located in states which are one level below the high point of strength in the system.” [8]

It was these “national” barriers that were effaced somewhat with Ireland’s involvement in the Marshall Plan in the period following World War II. Rising dollar trade deficits, external political pressures tied to Marshall Aid and European integration, and economic recession, the Irish regime changed the industrialization program from ISI to export-led industrialization (ELI).[9] Up until Ireland’s involvement with the Plan, the Fianna Fail government pursued an exclusionary policy of economic autarky severely restricting foreign capital inputs and providing high tariff barriers for the protection of indigenous industry. [10] Importantly, the aid provided through the Plan functioned very much like a structural adjustment loan. Capital to fund the economic incentives to MNCs came from the IMF and World Bank and funds were also borrowed internationally, deriving originally from the proceeds of oil revenues from the Arab world often referred to as ‘petrodollars’.[11]Once Ireland accepted Marshall Aid it was forced to dismantle industrial protectionism and attract export-oriented foreign capital by setting up bodies such as Bord Trachtála and the Industrial Development Authority (IDA), and by introducing incentives such as capital grants and export profits-tax relief.[12] The removal of protection began after Ireland joined the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) in the 1950s-a prerequisite for receiving Marshall Aid-and ended when Ireland joined the EEC in 1972. Importantly, these policies were in place before Minister for Finance Whitaker published his famous Economic Development in the late 1950s – commonly referred to as the landmark of the Irish State’s economic development. Here Whitaker was claimed to have ‘introduced’ modern planning to Ireland, alleged to be the first of a long succession of measures of the state’s ‘chasing progress’.[13] According to O’Hearn, there was a clear fall of tariff receipts during ELI, beginning in 1959 when OEEC free trade pressures became severe.[14]

In the period that followed Ireland did see an increase in foreign direct investment, but as O’Hearn highlights, there were negative implications to Ireland’s “export-led foreign-dominated policies”:

TNCs imported nearly all of the material inputs they used in production and exported nearly all of their outputs, so they did not create demand for Irish products (backward linkages) nor did they supply downstream Irish companies which used their semi-fabricated products in the use of something else (forward linkages).[15]

A growing disparity increased between the official economic growth rates and the domestic economic results due to foreign debt and TNC repatriation, return of voluntary emigration, and the failure of foreign sectors to link indigenous economic sectors.[16]

In 1972 after Ireland joined the EEC further pressure was placed to pursue a trajectory of full-fledged free trade, growth of output and investment became slower as foreign penetration became higher, and growth rates became particularly low (and finally negative).[17] Correspondingly, a negative impact was seen as the numbers of unemployed and unemployment rates in Ireland began to increase afterwards, as competition from free trade caused indigenous firms to close.[18] While the EC is credited with modernising Ireland’s social security programme, it could conversely be argued that through the implementation of these macroeconomic policies which ultimately hollowed out much of the existing indigenous industry, it in fact exasperated the need for social security. Ironically, amid all the talk of Ireland’s “impressive” economic output, it has been reported that “…by 1987, Ireland, although performance has improved considerably was actually relatively poorer than in 1957.”[19]

As this indicates, Ireland’s economy at this point was still nowhere near the ‘miracle’ it would later be claimed to be. In fact, Ireland’s miracle economy has oft been linked to the social partnership agreements in 1987.[20] This ‘produced wage growth consistent with competitiveness and embodied a negotiated consensus on a range of economic and social policies [the Social Protocol[21]], including the Maastricht criteria for entry to EMU [Economic and Monetary Union].’[22] This functioned as a powerful tipping of the asymmetrical balance further in the favour of capital through supply-side policies. Van Silke in her interesting analysis of the “consensus-building” of the period, demonstrates how the influence of dependency and modernisation theories, widespread Irish nationalism, the significance of the supply side, free trade strategy of the 1960s as well as the influential role of the ESRI all came together to discredit Keynesianism, leading to adoption of macroeconomic policies by the main trade unions.[23] It is important to consider also that in the period between 1989 and 2001, EU structural funds are estimated to have contributed about €12 billion to the Irish economy[1] which were allegedly designed to promote convergence in economic growth and living standards between the poorer regions of the Union and its core regions. With the unprecedented economic growth in the Irish State of the 1990s, Ireland, under the presupposition that convergence had actually occurred, seemed to have thrown off the historical shackles of peripheralisation. As Lyons and Grant stated at the time, “Ireland perceives itself as a core state by being a member of the EC, and it is classified by the OECD as a core state.” However, they continue, “Yet it is obvious that both core and peripheral processes operate within Ireland.”[24] It remained to be seen whether Ireland had or had not been “admitted”[25] to the core. The test to this hypothesis came in the guise of a series of events that would rock the international economy to its core.

“Organized Hypocrisy” in the IMF

Under mounting pressure from the international community, on 28 November, 2010, the Irish State agreed to a €85 billion rescue deal from the European Union and the International Monetary Fund. The rescue deal was made up of €22.5 billion from the European Financial Stability Mechanism (EFSM), €22.5 billion from the IMF, €22.5 billion from the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF), €17.5 billion from the Irish sovereign National Pension Reserve Fund (NPRF) as well as bilateral loans from the United Kingdom, Denmark and Sweden.[26] The popularised view was that the financial crisis in Ireland was the result of poor fiscal policy and “profligacy” within the nation-state alone. Importantly, the IMF is mandated to “oversee the international monetary system and monitor the economic and financial policies of its 188 member countries…. As part of this [surveillance] process, which takes place both at the global level and in individual countries, the IMF highlights possible risks to stability and advises on needed policy adjustments. In this way, it helps the international monetary system serve its essential purpose of facilitating the exchange of goods, services, and capital among countries, thereby sustaining sound economic growth.[27]

In light of the focus of our discussion, it is important, then, to turn to the IMF’s surveillance of said policies in the years preceding and immediately after the crash. Furthermore, reading these against the organisational cleavages of the IMF at this period proffers another interesting insight to our argument. According to Cathering Weaver:

In summer of 2007, the IMF announced a Medium-Term Strategy in a response to its rather dramatic fall from grace since the financial crises in East Asia in the late 1990s and in Argentina in 2001-2. In the face of negative net lending with no reprieve in sight, the IMF is searching for a new purpose and renewed legitimacy. The response has been a conscious effort to define a reform strategy that promises not only a difficult transformation of the IMF’s governance (foremost its subscription and voting rules on the executive board), but also a quite substantial shift in the organization’s mission. This foremost includes a diminished “bailout” lending focus and enhanced surveillance role (through revised Article IV consultation processes) to strengthen the IMF’s capacity for financial crisis prevention…It thus seems quite likely, in obvious conditions of organizational insecurity compounded by goal incongruence, that we will see elements of organized hypocrisy in the IMF in the near future in terms of the espoused policies and goals versus the full implementation and enforcement of the new surveillance function. What remains to be seen is what form that hypocrisy takes and how long it persists.[28]

Part of this ‘organizational insecurity’ (and dare I say “organizational hypocricy”(sic)) must have taken seed in the form of the Article IV reports of 2009. In its 2009 Article IV report on Ireland, the IMF had this to say:

Well before the crisis hit, public finances had developed serious structural weaknesses. The facts are well known. In the boom years, personal income tax rates were lowered and expenditure grew rapidly (at about the highest pace amongst OECD economies). Buoyant property-related revenues stamp duties; VAT and capital taxes masked the growing structural deficit which reached 12.5% of GDP in 2008.[29]

It continues:

Various commentators and the IMF in its Article IV consultations did warn that the seemingly unstoppable growth masked serious imbalances, including the fragility of public finances.[30]

Yet in comparing the sense of clarity over the extent of Ireland’s financial vulnerability to the advice provided in previous policy surveillance reports, it seems hindsight has had quite a role to play. While the Fund correctly identified that stronger tax receipts were in part the result of buoyancy of the property market and urged that the government resist political pressure to spend the windfall in 2004 and 2005, curiously this recommendation was absent in 2006.[31] In 2007, a slightly different but related point was made in the staff report which noted that some weakening of the fiscal position was likely on the basis of unchanged policies in 2008 because of a cooling property market.[32] O’Leary has commented that,

While the IMF identified the issue of transitory tax receipts, there is nothing in the Executive Board assessments or the staff reports to indicate an appreciation of quite how big a problem this would become. The 2007 staff report seemed to suggest that it could be insured against by a combination of limiting the increase in current spending to the growth rate in nominal GDP and refraining from tax cuts, a policy prescription that now seems remarkably timid. [33]

Another point worthy of particular note is the mention of the Fund’s “awareness of serious imbalances, including the fragility of public finances”[34] in the period following the crisis is undermined in the following statement:

…most Directors considered that a modest fiscal tightening would be desirable in 2007, given the strength of domestic demand, potential risks of a hard landing, and the need to prepare for population ageing…A number of Directors, however, saw less merit in fiscal tightening at the current juncture, pointing for the need for further increases in spending to achieve social goals.’[35]

This statement captures the crisis of identity within the Fund in this period, conveying the uncertainty of the organisation’s commitment to this new epoch of “neo-liberalism with a human face.”[36] Such ambiguity as to the fiscal objectives the Fund proposed were at the very least harmful to Ireland’s public spending.

Moving on to the IMF assessment of the banking sector’s fiscal and prudential policies (a critical facet of the good governance discourse) proffers equally interesting results; Patrick Honohan, Governor of the Irish Central Bank acknowledges in his Banking Inquiry report that the Financial Stability Reports were “too reassuring.”[37] He also notes that this confidence was conveyed also in the assessments of external actors:

Admittedly, the views of outside bodies such as the IMF and OECD – especially in later years – were not sharply different and must have provided reassurance to any internal doubters. In particular, the relatively glowing 2006 update of the IMF‘s specialised Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP) mission – an exercise designed precisely to identify any weaknesses in prudential regulation and financial stability policy – would have been enough to set any doubts that may have existed at rest. The FSAP Report‘s misinterpretation – for whatever reasons – of the prevailing Irish situation must be considered unfortunate. [38]

Honohan’s confidence deriving from the reports was not misplaced, and certainly would have helped to allay any concerns with the health of the Irish banking sector. The first paragraph states:

Financial institution profitability and capitalisation are currently very strong, with Irish banking sector profits amongst the highest in Western Europe. Reflecting their good performance, the major Irish banks receive upper medium to high-grade ratings from the international ratings agencies.[39]

Highlighting the main recommendations of the FSAP team focused on upgrading staff numbers and skills, with the stress-testing exercise selected for special mention. However, mitigating any potential apprehension on this score, the team remarked reassuringly that ?”reflecting the general robustness of the financial system and the supervisory framework, these recommendations are primarily for further enhancements rather than reflecting a need to address fundamental weaknesses.” [40] The FSAP team‘s assessment of the new integrated supervisory framework was positive; it noted that

notwithstanding the higher profile of the IFSRA‘s consumer protection activities, there have also been significant achievements in the prudential framework?, and that ?it has created an organisational structure and a consistent corporate culture that are likely to enhance financial stability.[41]

So far as the Basel Core Principles (BCP) for Effective Bank Supervision were concerned, the assessment found ”a high degree of observance of the BCPs. The main challenge was seen as ensuring continuation of existing very high standards.”[42] Thus as Honohan notes, the 2006 FSAP Report would have had a “significant dissuasive effect on concerns that might otherwise have been raised about prudential supervision and the risks to financial stability.” In hindsight such an “unwarrantedly favourable report by an authoritative international body was clearly unhelpful.”[43]

While the IMF identified some of the vulnerabilities of the Irish economy prior to the crash, to state that the Fund noted the full extent of these vulnerabilities is grossly inaccurate; and would require that one consider the part and not the whole sum of the reports given in the fact that their overall outlook of the economy was unquestionably positive. The overemphasis of the IMF’s awareness might well be the result of inner tensions and instabilities within the organisation at the time leading to an “organized hypocrisy.” Certainly the Fund’s failure to identify and prevent a crisis (Thereby challenging the Fund’s claim that “The IMF’s technical assistance helps countries improve the capacity of their institutions and the effectiveness of their policymaking.”[44]) are likely part of an overall goal of regaining credibility and legitimising its claim to technocratic authority in its extended surveillance and crisis prevention functions. Yet we must also consider the Fund in its role in the wider international economic order.

The Paradox of “Sovereign” Debt

Importantly, amid the chaos of the international financial crisis of 2008, the Fund’s main shareholders (particularly the leading G-5 economies including the USA, UK, Germany, Japan and France) were all facing multiple overlapping crises of their own.[45] As a self-proclaimed “pillar supporting the structure of the world’s economic and financial order.”[46] By its own admission, “the IMF is in a sense owned and directed by the governments of member nations.”[47] Thus the principal–agent relations and intra-organizational dynamics of the Fund in the context of Europe are noteworthy. The former is

actively engaged in Europe as a provider of policy advice, financing, and technical assistance. We work both independently and, in European Union (EU) countries, in cooperation with European institutions, such as the European Commission (EC) and the European Central Bank (ECB).[48]

In considering the democratic deficit apparent in the weighted voting of the Fund (incidentally a contentious focus for potential reform of the institute), we will seek to challenge the claim to economic neutrality[49] espoused by the Fund. In using a complementary framework of Foucauldian and world-systems theory we can assess the relevance of the weighted voting system to see if the Fund has been instrumental in the continuance of mechanisms of “unequal-exchange” between Ireland as internal periphery to the core areas —such as those that make up the voting majority on the Board of Directors.

The very fact that total debt (private and public) of the peripheral countries has risen between two- and threefold since entering the EMU[50] lends credence to this notion of “unequal exchange.” According to Lapavitas:

Peripheral current accounts worsened steadily since the mid-1990s on the approach to European Monetary Union, and the deficits became entrenched once the euro was adopted. Germany, meanwhile, has registered regular surpluses since the introduction of the euro. The deficits of the periphery reached extraordinary levels in the second half of the 2000s, nearing 15% in Greece in 2007 and 2008.[51]

Placing the sovereign debt crisis within the context of the world economy, Lucarelli writes,

Although the financial crisis originated in the United States in the wake of the subprime loans debacle, the contagion soon engulfed Europe as a result of the exposure of European banks to mortgage-backed securities and other toxic assets. The aftershocks of the cessation of interbank lending in late 2008 triggered the onset of the sovereign debt crisis.[52]

The sum total of exposure to the four countries came to $1579bn, of which $254bn, or approximately 16%, was government debt; the bulk of which (both private and public) was held by French and German banks,[53] which the IMF has noted was in a far weaker position to cover than the American banks.[54] With regard to public debt, the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) estimated that French and German banks held, respectively, $48bn and $33bn of Spanish debt, $31bn and $23bn of Greek debt, and $21bn and $10bn of Portuguese debt. While the BIS estimates that Eurozone banks, as of December 2009, had exposure of $727bn to Spain, $244bn to Portugal, $206bn to Greece, and $402bn to Ireland.[55] Furthermore, the expansionary fiscal policies eventually enacted by the Eurozone member states provided a temporary respite for these commercial banks. But as tax revenues collapsed as a result of the recession, member states, most notably in the peripheral regions, experienced a sovereign debt crisis. According to Lucarelli, it was the same banks, supported by the IMF and the European Commission that demanded a program of austerity and wage cuts and threatened to curtail their lending to those governments that failed to comply.[56]

International economic policies that favour the core along with the fact that the IMF’s work in Europe ‘has intensified since the start of the global financial crisis in 2008, and has been further stepped up since mid-2010 as a result of the euro area crisis,”[57] merely highlights how the IMF has been instrumental in protecting the interests of its shareholders through its increased surveillance of the periphery. It might in fact be fair to say that through a process of reciprocity, the EU and IMF alliance lent much needed intra-organisational legitimacy to one another. As Coplovich suggests, loan to peripherial Eurozone members are crucial for the Fund’s survival as a ‘central force in the global economy’, and increasing commitments in Europe will no doubt keep it gainfully occupied for several years to come.[58] No longer in fear of its own tentative future (In 2007, the IMF’s sudden ten-fold decline in outstanding member obligations from nearly SDR 70 billion in 2004 to about SDR 7 billion in 2007 (IMF, 2007: 36) as clients such as Indonesia, Mexico, Russia, Thailand and finally Argentina, Brazil and Turkey dropped out of the Fund’s list of loyal clients.[59]) Similarly the core EU countries, in deploying their principal-agent relationship to the Fund, gained much need authority in its desire to “contain” the structural crisis arising from over three decades of neoliberal policies of disinflation. The counterpart to the rescue package has been the imposition of austerity on the periphery, and increasingly on the core.[60]

Sovereign Debt or Sovereign Death?

While one reading of the IMF’s intervention in Ireland might be that it sought to legitimise its claim to technocratic authority, a much more plausible understanding as to some of the factors leading up to “rescue package” is offered when reading it as a pillar “supporting the world’s economic and financial order.” This betrays something of the status quo the IMF is mandated to uphold. An alternative reading of the “sovereign” debt crisis might thus read: In the heat of the 2008 financial crisis, peripheral countries, like Ireland, were essentially instrumental in cooling the vital centre.

In his study of Ireland, Perrons suggests that Ireland is an ideal internal periphery. Yet one must ask ideal for whom? The sovereign debt crisis and Ireland’s EU-IMF bailout, shows up the false growth associated with the Celtic Tiger, and demonstrates the impossibility of the periphery being “admitted” or indeed converging to the core. Ireland in 2004, the IMF had this to say: ‘Executive Directors commended the continued impressive performance of Ireland’s economy, which is based on sound economic policies, providing useful lessons for other countries.’[61] Yet the IMF’s disciplinary stance (viewed as an instrumental mechanism by which the core can ‘make an example’ of Ireland and other peripheral Eurozone countries), exposes much about the lengths the core areas are willing to go to ‘cool themselves’. Ultimately the costs of rescuing the euro and the banks have been shifted onto society at large, where an emerging theme is occurring, partly at the behest of the IMF, liberalisation measures have been imposed on peripheral countries, above all, in the labour market.[62] Significantly, if it was truly social partnership’s institutionalisation (as part of Social Protocol of the Maastricht Treaty) in Ireland that brought about Ireland’s Celtic Tiger, then it is perhaps ironic (and controversial) to say that it is the very substance of the same treaty that contributed to its downfall. At the very least, Ireland offers a cautionary tale to other countries seeking to “chase progression.”

Sophie Reynolds is studying for an LLM in Law and Social Justice at Birkbeck College, London. This essay was written as an assignment in the International Economic Law, Justice and Development module.

Notes

 


[1] Peadar Kirby, ‘Globalization, the Celtic Tiger and Social Outcomes: Is Ireland a Model or a Mirage? Globalization’s December 2004, Vol. 1, No. 2, pp. 205–222

[2] For example see Joseph Stiglitz’s introduction in Karl Polyani, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time,

[3] http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/exrp/differ/differ.htm

[4] See for example: Sean D. Barrett, ‘The EU/IMF Rescue Programme for Ireland: 2010- 2013’ Econ

[5] Kenneth Rogoff, Economic Counsellor and Director of the Research Department
International Monetary Fund, ‘The IMF Strikes Back,’ http://www.imf.org/external/np/vc/2003/021003.htm Reproduced with permission from FOREIGN POLICY 134 (January/February 2003) www.foreignpolicy.com

[6] Taylor, P. 1988. “The Poverty ofIntemational Comparisons: Some Methodological Lessons

from World-Systems Analysis.” Studies in Comparative International Development

22: 12-39.

[7] Richard Grant and Donald Lyons, ‘The Republic of Ireland in the World-Economy: An Exploration of Dynamics in the Semiperiphery’ in Martin G. Martin Semi-Peripheral States in the World Economy (Greenwood Press: USA, 1990) p. 127

[8] Immanuel Wallerstein, The Essential Wallerstein, p,88-90

[9] Denis O’Hearn, ‘The Irish Case of Dependency: An Exception to the Exceptions?’ American Sociological Review, Vol. 54, No. 4 (Aug., 1989), pp. 578-596 http://www.jstor.org/stable/2095880 (Accessed: 13/01/2013 00:36)

[10] Richard Grant and Donald Lyons, ‘The Republic of Ireland in the World-Economy: An Exploration of Dynamics in the Semiperiphery’ in Martin G. Martin Semi-Peripheral States in the World Economy (Greenwood Press: USA, 1990) p. 125-6

[11] Tom O’Connor, ‘The structural failure of Irish economic development and employment policy’ Irish Journal of Public Policy A peer-reviewed journal providing an electronic open-access forum for politics, political science, government, public policy and public administration 2009-1117 Volume 2 Issue 1

[12] Irish Society: Sociological Perspectives, p. 92

[13] John Curt Jacobsen, CHASING PROGRESS IN THE IRISH REPUBLIC: Ideology, democracy and dependent development (CUP: UK, 1994)

[14] O’Hearn, ‘The Irish Case of Dependency: An Exception to the Exceptions?’ American Sociological Review, Vol. 54, No. 4 (Aug., 1989), pp. 579 http://www.jstor.org/stable/2095880 (Accessed: 13/01/2013 00:36)

[15] Irish Society: Sociological Perspectives, p. 92

[16] Irish Society: Sociological Perspectives, p. 92

[17] O’Hearn, ‘The Irish Case of Dependency: An Exception to the Exceptions?’ American Sociological Review, Vol. 54, No. 4 (Aug., 1989), p. 587 http://www.jstor.org/stable/2095880 (Accessed: 13/01/2013 00:36)

[18] Irish Society: Sociological Perspectives, p. 93

[19] B. Girvin, “Did Ireland Benefit From the Marshall Plan?: Choice, Strategy and the National Interest in a Comparative Context” in T. Gieger and M. Kennedy (eds.) Ireland, Europe and the Marshall Plan, (Four Courts Press: Dublin, 2004) p. 117

[20] See for example: Neil Collins, Terry Cradden, Political Issues in Ireland Today: Third Edition, p 9; Ray MacSharry and Padraic Whyte

[21] “Article 2 [of the Social Protocol], which seeks to foster the dialogue between management and labour,

specifically recognizes that the Community must “take account of the diverse forms of national practices, in particular in the field of contractual relations, and the need to maintain the competitiveness of the Community Economy”.Meanwhile, Article 3 requires the Commission to consult both management and labour before submitting proposals; and Article 4 allows them to arrive at a voluntary collective agreement covering the issues in question as a substitute for Community action. “Stephen J.H. Dearden, “European Union social policy and Flexible Production” International Journal of Manpower, Vol. 16 No. 10, 1995, pp. 3-13.

[22] O’Donnell, R. (2000) The new Ireland in the new Europe, in O’Donnell, R. (ed.), Europe: The Irish Experience (Dublin:

IEA), p. 188

[23] SILKE VAN DYK ‘From peripherality and conflict to consensus-based success?

Applying a Foucauldian perspective on power and discourse to the Irish model of social partnership’ Irish Journal of Sociology Vol. 17.1, 2009, p. 84

[24] Richard Grant and Donald Lyons, ‘The Republic of Ireland in the World-Economy: An Exploration of Dynamics in the Semiperiphery’ in Martin G. Martin Semi-Peripheral States in the World Economy (Greenwood Press: USA, 1990) p. 125-6

[25] Ibid. p. 125-6

[26] http://www.finance.gov.ie/documents/publications/reports/2011/euimfrevised.pdf

[27] http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/surv.htm

[28] Catherine Weaver, Hypocrisy Trap: The World Bank and the Poverty of Reform, (UK: Princeton UP, 2008), pp. 181-2

[29] http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2009/cr09195.pdf

[30] Ibid.

[31] Jim O’Leary, “External Surveillance of Irish Fiscal Policy During the Boom” DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS FINANCE & ACCOUNTING WORKING PAPERS, National University of Ireland, Maynooth, SERIES N210-10 http://economics.nuim.ie/research

[32] Ibid.

[33] Ibid.

[34] http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2009/cr09195.pdf

[35] See IMF (2006).

[36] Craig Johnson, Arrested Development: The Power of Knowledge for Social Change, (Routledge: USA, 2009)pp. 7-8

[37] Patrick Honohan,” The Irish Banking Crisis : Regulatory and Financial Stability Policy 2003-2008” – A Report to the Minister for Finance by the Governor of the Central Bank, May 2010 http://www.bankinginquiry.gov.ie/The%20Irish%20Banking%20Crisis%20Regulatory%20and%20Financial%20Stability%20Policy%202003-2008.pdf

[38] Ibid. p. 10

[39] (IMF, 2006b p. 5). Cited at Patrick Honohan,” The Irish Banking Crisis : Regulatory and Financial Stability Policy 2003-2008” – A Report to the Minister for Finance by the Governor of the Central Bank, May 2010 http://www.bankinginquiry.gov.ie/The%20Irish%20Banking%20Crisis%20Regulatory%20and%20Financial%20Stability%20Policy%202003-2008.pdf p. 90-1

[40] Ibid. p. 91-2

[41] (ibid p. 24).

[42] (ibid p. 28).

[43] Patrick Honohan,” The Irish Banking Crisis : Regulatory and Financial Stability Policy 2003-2008” – A Report to the Minister for Finance by the Governor of the Central Bank, May 2010 http://www.bankinginquiry.gov.ie/The%20Irish%20Banking%20Crisis%20Regulatory%20and%20Financial%20Stability%20Policy%202003-2008.pdf p. 91-2

[44] http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/pdf/europe.pdf

[45] Ali Burak Guven ‘The IMF, the World Bank, and the Global Economic Crisis: Exploring Paradigm Continuity’ in Development and Change 43(4): 869–898. 2012 International Institute of Social Studies

 

[46] http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/exrp/differ/differ.htm

[47] http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/exrp/differ/differ.htm

[49] See also: Richard Swedberg, ‘The Doctrine of Economic Neutrality of the IMF and the World Bank’ Journal of Peace Research (Sage Publications, Ltd.), Vol. 23, No. 4 (Dec., 1986), pp. 377-390

Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/424107 . Accessed: 12/01/2013 15:34

[50] C Lapavitsas et al “The Eurozone Between austerity and Default.” Research in Money and Finance Occasional Report, Department of Money and Finance, School of Oriental and African Studies, London, September 2010.

[51] Ibid. p 11

p. 11

[52] Bill Lucarelli, ‘German Neomercantilism and the European Sovereign Debt Crisis’ Journal of Post Keynesian Economics / Winter 2011–12, Vol. 34, No. 2 205

[53] Ibid.

[54] Ibid.205

[55] BIS (2010: 18-9) International banking and financial market developments, BIS Quarterly Cited at: Review, June Cited at: Lapavitsas, c.; Kaltenbrunner, a.; lambrinidis, D.G.; lindo, D.; Meadway, J.;

Mitchell, J.; Painceira, J.P.; Pires, J.; Powell, a.; Senfors, a.; and Teles, N. “The Eurozone Between austerity and Default.” Research in Money and Finance Occasional Report, Department of Money and Finance, School of Oriental and African Studies, London, September 2010. p. 11

[56] Bill Lucarelli, ‘German Neomercantilism and the European Sovereign Debt Crisis’ Journal of Post Keynesian Economics / Winter 2011–12, Vol. 34, No. 2 209

[58] Ali Burak Guven ‘The IMF, the World Bank, and the Global Economic Crisis: Exploring Paradigm Continuity’ in Development and Change 43(4): 869–898. 2012 International Institute of Social Studies

[59] Ibid. p. 871

[60] C Lapavitsas et al;“The Eurozone Between austerity and Default.” Research in Money and Finance Occasional Report, Department of Money and Finance, School of Oriental and African Studies, London, September 2010. p. 11

[61] Jim O’Leary, “External Surveillance of Irish Fiscal Policy During the Boom” DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS FINANCE & ACCOUNTING WORKING PAPERS, National University of Ireland, Maynooth, SERIES N210-10 http://economics.nuim.ie/research/

[62] C Lapavitsas et al;“The Eurozone Between austerity and Default.” Research in Money and Finance Occasional Report, Department of Money and Finance, School of Oriental and African Studies, London, September 2010. p. 11

 

The following two tabs change content below.

Latest posts by Sophie Reynolds (see all)