Posts By Michael Burke

ge

Declining US Profits and Private Investment

, , Comment Closed

This article was originally published on Socialist Economic Bulletin on Tuesday, 2nd of June. 

US corporate profits fell in the first quarter of 2015. This is the second consecutive fall, technically causing a ‘profits recession’. The nominal level of profits of $2014.8bn in Q1 was lower than in Q2 2012. Profits have fallen to 11.4% of GDP, compared to 12.2% at their pre-crisis peak in Q3 2006. The trend in corporate profits is shown in Fig. 1 below. 

  Fig.1 US Corporate Profits Source: BEA
 
 
The motor force of capitalist economies is the accumulation of capital via profits, as the name suggests. ‘Demand-led’ or ‘wage-led’ economies are a logical impossibility for the simple reason the wages, or demand, or any other comparable variable follow the production process. There can be no wages or demand without prior production.

Falling profits in a recovery is extremely unusual. But this is the third time this has happened during this weak recovery. In effect, because the economy lacks any great momentum, it is easy for external effects to push profits lower. This could be poor weather, a stronger US Dollar, shipping strikes, weak overseas demand, and so on.

But the effect of a sustained fall in profits is simple. Companies exist to realise profits and will stop investing if profits fall. In Fig. 2 below US corporate profits and US private sector fixed investment are shown in nominal terms for the purposes of comparison.

The Great Recession was preceded by a decline in profits and the fall in fixed investment followed with a time lag. This was a classic profits-led recession, which was partly obscured by the speculative frenzy that continued until 2007 (but which is a recurring end-of-cycle phenomenon).  

 Fig.2 Profits & Private Fixed Investment. Source: BEA
 
 
However, until now private sector fixed investment has not suffered a fall in the current expansion despite the preceding short-lived declines in nominal profits. Since the low-point in private investment at the beginning of 2010 there has been an uninterrupted rise in private investment until the final quarter of 2014.

Read Post →

LabLeadershipC

Did New Labour Spend Too Much?

, , Comment Closed

This article originally appeared on the Socialist Economic Bulletin on Tuesday, 19th of May.

It is not sufficient for big business to have secured an election victory and an overall Parliamentary majority for the Tory Party. It is also necessary to intervene in the Labour Party to ensure that its leadership also conforms to big business interests too. This has currently taken the form of candidates in the leadership contest being asked to declare that Labour ‘spent too much’ in the run-up into the Great Recession. Answering Yes to this question is effectively a loyalty oath to big business interests, a renunciation even of the social democratic vestige of economic policy under New Labour.

The question is economically illiterate. It is taken as axiomatic that if there was a deficit that spending must have been too high. But all deficits are composed of two items; spending and income. In the case of government that income arises mainly in the form of taxes. It does not follow from the existence of a deficit that the culprit must be spending.

The reality is that measured as a proportion of GDP New Labour spent less on average than Margaret Thatcher. This is shown in Fig. 1 below. On average New Labour’s spending amounted to 41.5% of GDP. By comparison, under Thatcher government spending was 44.2%. In relation to the deficit, the taxation levels were also very different. Under New Labour taxation revenues were on average 37.5% of GDP. Under Thatcher taxation revenues amounted to 42.0% of GDP.

Read Post →

flag_gk_eu

Greek Myths Retold

, , Comment Closed

This article originally appeared on Socialist Economic Bulletin on Friday the 24th of April. 

The world economy is not strong and the President of the United States is sufficiently concerned about new shocks to it that he recently met the Greek Finance Minister to urge ‘flexibility on all sides’ in the negotiations between the Syriza-led government and its creditors. US concern is fully justified. 

In any attempt to reach agreement it is important both to have an objective assessment of the situation and to understand the perspective of those on the opposite side of the table. In Mythology that blocks progress in Greece Martin Wolf, the chief economics commentator for the Financial Times argues that negotiations to date are dominated by myths. He demolishes some of these key myths in turn: that a Greek exit would make the Eurozone stronger, that it would make Greece stronger, that Greece caused the crisis driven by private sector lending, that there has been no effort by Greeks to repay these debts, that Greece has the capacity to repay them, and that defaulting on the debts necessarily entails leaving the Eurozone. 

Together, these provide a useful corrective to the propaganda emanating from the Eurogroup of Finance Ministers and ECB Board members. Some of this is slanderous, in repeating myths about ‘lazy Greeks’ (who have among the longest working hours in Europe). Much of it is delusional, based on the notion that Greece can be forced to pay up, or forced out of the Euro without any negative consequences for the meandering European or the world economy. 

Austerity ideology
 

A genuine belief in a false idea, or a demonstrably false system of ideas constitutes an ideology in the strict meaning of that word. Inconvenient facts are relegated in importance or distorted, and secondary or inconsequential matters are magnified. Logical contortions become the norm. 

All these are prevalent in the dominant ideology in economics, which is supplemented by another key weapon, the helpful forecast. In Britain for example, supporters of austerity argued it would not hurt growth and the deficit would fall. Now there is finally a recovery of sorts, they argue austerity worked, ignoring all the preceding five years and the unsustainable nature of the current recovery (and the limited progress in reducing the deficit). 

For Greece the much more severe austerity and its consequences means that supporters are still obliged to rely on the helpful forecast to support their case. The Martin Wolf piece includes a chart of IMF data on Greek government debt as a percentage of GDP, which is reproduced in Fig.1 below. 

The IMF includes not only data recorded in previous years but its own projections for future years. From a government debt level of 176% of GDP in 2014, the IMF forecasts a fall to 174% this year and 171% in 2016 and much sharper declines in future years. The IMF has also forecast an imminent decline in Greek government debt ever since austerity was first imposed in 2010, which has not materialised. 

Read Post →

mb3

Bernanke versus Summers and the Irish ‘Recovery’

, , Comment Closed

There is widely followed debate between Ben Bernanke and Larry Summers which has important implications for the Irish economy and its trajectory. 

Summers, who holds innumerable titles is a Harvard Professor and formerly chief economist at the World Bank, initiated the debate with the view that the advanced industrialised economies were experiencing ‘secular stagnation’ (pdf). Bernanke, who is ex-chair of the Board of the US Federal Reserve Bank, accepts that the industrialised economies have been experiencing weak growth but argues that that this was because of very different and easily remedial problems.

They are both wrong. Those who are interested in their detailed arguments, and the responses and counters, should read their many articles and papers in full. But the debate does shed light on some key problems, and the shortcomings of mainstream answers. Here the particular relevance is to the Irish economy.i

In dismissing the idea of ‘secular stagnation’ (that is, a long-term economic malaise which is distinct from the recent slump and its aftermath) Bernanke argues that it is the imbalances of savings and investment between countries that are the key problems. In a generic sense this would place Ireland in the dock, since the CSO reports a current account surplus in 2014 of €11.4bn, roughly 6% of GDP. Ireland escapes Bernanke’s censure, unlike China, because the scale of the Irish surplus is trivial in a global context.

But this highlights a wider point. The Irish current account surplus barely represents the activities of anyone based in Ireland at all. It is due to the activities of multinational corporations, many of them US-based, who park profits and other activity in Ireland to avail of ultra-low corporate taxes. Any national accounts are the sum of the different sectors, or classes, operating within it.

Risk and reward

Summers’ analysis has the merit of not treating the world as an economic version of the board game Risk. He relates ‘secular stagnation’ to the declining rate of productive investment (plant & machinery, factories, software, vehicles and so on, not housing) by companies operating in the industrialised economies.  He also argues austerity is counter-productive, as it reduces their incentives to invest.

But Summers uses the economic jargon the ‘declining natural rate of interest’ to describe the decline of investment. This is in effect a decline in profitable investment or the requirement for investment to achieve profitability (citing companies such as Google and Apple who are hoarding vast sums of cash or WhatsApp which required little productive investment before becoming a stock market darling).

Yet WhatsApp made only losses, not profits before it was bought by Facebook for $22billion. Summers confuses stock market or financial speculation returns with profits. It is also the case that both Apple and Google do invest in new products, and require increasing productive capacity to do so. It is simply that the growth in their profits exceeds the growth in their investment, so that the cash hoard continues to grow. In effect, this is a drain on the economy as profits are realised but this capital is withdrawn from productive use.

How does any of this affect Ireland (apart from many of these companies being based here, for accounting purposes or otherwise)?  This is shown in Fig.1 below, the total financial balances of two key sectors of the economy, companies (Non-Financial Corporations, NFCs) and government. 

 

Read Post →

2010

Not a Vintage Year

, , Comment Closed

This is a post by Michael Burke originally posted on Notes on the FrontMichael works as an economic consultant. He was previously senior international economist with Citibank in London. He blogs regularly at Socialist Economic Bulletin.  You can follow Michael at @menburke

The publication of the ESRI’s latest Quarterly Economic Commentary follows the recent publication of the national accounts for 2014. But they were both strangely muted affairs given that the headlines were GDP growth of 4.8% in 2014 and GNP growth of 5.2%. The ESRI is forecasting 4.4% and 4.1% respectively for 2015- although it does not have a very good forecasting track record.

Not only are these the strongest actual and projected growth rates since the recession began but they are also the strongest growth rates in both the EU and in the OECD. So why the long face? Why are people still taking to the streets to protest water charges and the government parties getting no bounce in the opinion polls?

One factor is that despite all the talk of recovery, even on the distorted GDP measure of activity the patient is still convalescing. The economy has not returned to its pre-recession peak, as shown in Chart 1 below. GDP contracted by 12% from the end of 2007 to the end of 2009. In the 5 following years about 70% of that shortfall has been recovered.  On that trend it will be 2016 before the economy is finally in recovery.

Chart 1. Real GDP

MB ESRI 1

On most indicators including GDP the level of activity is now back to around the level last seen in 2010, which was hardly a vintage year. Following a deep recession, industrialised economies much more usually bounce back equally sharply. But this is a slow, painful and incomplete recovery from a deep recession.

Stagnation apart from exports

There is another factor in the subdued mood. GDP is a measure of activity. But it is not designed to be a measure of prosperity. It is widely accepted that recorded export activity is hugely distorted by the activities of multinational company operations in Ireland. Yet since the economy stopped contracting at the end of 2009 these highly distorted net exports (exports after imports are deducted) have risen by an annualised €16bn, almost exactly equal to the rise in GDP.  Net exports, many of them purely fictitious, account for the entirety of the partial recovery.

Chart 2 below shows that the key components of domestic activity are either still falling or are stagnating after a sharp fall. Personal consumption is over €7bn below its peak on an annualised basis and is stagnating. Government spending is €5.6bn below its peak and continues to contract. Popular anger is actually inclined to grow the more there is talk of ‘recovery’.

But the most dramatic contraction is in fixed investment which is now €23.6bn below its peak at the beginning of 2007. The decline in investment led the recession and continues to act as the main brake on recovery. The fall in investment now far outstrips the total decline in GDP since the recession began.

Chart 2 Personal Consumption, Government Consumption and Investment

MB ESRI 2

There might be grounds for increased optimism if the ESRI were plausibly making the case for higher consumption, government spendign and investment. But that is not the case. Private consumption and government consumption are projectedf to rise by just 2% and 0.5% respectively in 2015. Investment is forecast to rise by 12.5% following a double-digit increase in 2014. Even if the ESRI’s optimism is borne out, the fall in investment is now 60% from its peak. So it would take another 4 years of growth at that pace to begin a full recovery.

Read Post →

1t

Economic Fundamentals and a Unified Irish Economy

, , Comment Closed

This article is based on a background paper which was delivered to a fringe meeting at the recent Sinn Féin Ard Fheis

In Ireland there are two separate economic entities. Their separation means they run up against the fundamental laws of economics, as first identified by Adam Smith[i]

In the first instance it is the size of the home market which determines the scope of the division of labour. But in Ireland both economies, by their separation, have a truncated home market. This was not always the case. As part of the British Empire the North East portion of the island was highly integrated into what was then the largest ‘home’ market in human history. At the same time most of the rest of the island was primarily a breeding ground for cattle, to help feed the large metropolitan imperial centres.

Post-Partition the situation has dramatically changed.  The Empire is gone while the southern economy has both developed a home market of a certain size while integrating itself to one of the world’s largest markets in the EU. This is the key fundamental fact which explains the dramatic changes in average living standards in the two parts of the Ireland since Partition. 

This is illustrated in Fig.1 below, which shows per capita GDP using common international Dollars (adjusted for Purchasing Power Parities, first Angus Maddison and then OECD). It amounts to a startling transformation of relative prosperity within Ireland.

To specify the data, Maddison shows that per capita GDP in Ireland in 1921 was $2,533 and that in Britain it was $4,439 (and from a variety of sources that average incomes in the north-east counties of Ireland was at least on a par with Britain). From OECD data per capita GDP in RoI was $37,581 in 2013 and in the UK it was 34,755 (and the ONS data shows NI per capita output was 82% of the UK level).

 fig1_mb

Read Post →

greek_neg

The Money Exists for Investment in Greece

, , Comment Closed

This article originally appeared in Socialist Economic Bulletin on Friday, the 27th of February

The fraught negotiations between the new Greek government and representatives of the EU institutions are likely to be prolonged. They have centred to date on Syriza’s efforts to find room to alleviate some of the worst effects of austerity and address what is called the ‘humanitarian crisis’.

This is entirely justifiable given the depth of the fall in living standards with widespread malnutrition in Greece, a health crisis, hundreds of thousands of homes cut off from electricity supply and other ills.

Policies aimed at income redistribution can help in this key area, so it is entirely correct to attempt to increase tax revenue from the rich in order to ameliorate the effects of poverty on the poor. But any sustainable improvement in living standards must be based on increasing the productive capacity of the economy which requires investment. Any transfer of income will be a one-off effect if income does not grow. Yet the austerity measures imposed by the Troika (EU Commission, European Central Bank and IMF) and the existing burden of debt interest payments prevent the government from investing and provide a further disincentive for the private sector to invest of its own volition.

Domestic sources of investment

There are two key sources of funds that could be tapped for investment; domestic and international.

Domestically the Greek business class claims the highest share of national income in the whole of the OECD. In 2013 (in nominal terms) the Gross Operating Surplus of Greek firms was €102.2bn from a GDP total of €182.4bn. This profit share in GDP of 56% is way in excess of the customary levels in the OECD. By comparison the German profit share in the same year was 39.3%.

A high profit share is not itself directly harmful to growth and prosperity. If firms were investing profits the productive capacity would be rising rapidly and new high-quality and high-paid jobs could easily be created. But the opposite is the case in Greece, which also has the lowest rate of investment as a proportion of GDP in the whole of the OECD. Again in nominal terms investment (Gross Fixed Capital Formation) in Greece in 2013 was just €20.5bn or 11.3% of GDP. By comparison the German proportion of investment was 19.8%.

This is not to hold up the German economic model to be emulated. Like all the Western economies (including Britain) the rate of investment in the German economy has slowed dramatically over several decades, which is the cause of the ‘secular stagnation’ of the Western economies over the same period.

Even so, the disparity in the profit rate and the investment rate is exceptional in Greece. The proportion of uninvested profits in Germany is equivalent to 19.5% of GDP (profits equal to 39.3% of GDP minus an investment level equivalent to 19.8%). This level of uninvested profits is very high by historical standards. But the proportion of uninvested profits in Greece is 44.7% (profits of 56% of GDP minus investment of 11.3%). The nominal level of profits and investment is shown in Fig. 1 below.

Read Post →

1

How the Austerity Con Works

, , Comment Closed

This article originally appeared on Socialist Economic Bulletin on Monday the 23rd of February. 

‘The Austerity Con’ is the title of a recent article in the London Review of Books. It is written by a leading Keynesian economist Professor Simon-Wren Lewis, who is also a fellow of Merton College, Oxford. The article is available to non-subscribers here. It deserves to be widely read because it contains two important arguments against austerity.

The first argument nails the lie that austerity was necessary because of an immediate crisis of government funding. The second argument exposes the myth that austerity has been responsible for an improvement in government finances. Both of these arguments will be familiar to regular readers of SEB and Prof. Wren-Lewis will give them a far wider airing. Given that averting the crisis in government finances is offered by the supporters of austerity as its main justification, the title of his piece is fully justified.

However there is a difference of view among opponents of austerity about the nature of the current crisis. It is important because it underpins both the overall analytical framework and the suggested policy prescriptions. Prof. Wren-Lewis says, “The place to begin is 2009. By then the full extent of the financial crisis had become apparent.” He goes on, “The financial crisis was leading consumers and firms to spend less and save more. That made sense for individuals, but the problem was that because everyone was doing it, the total amount of demand in the economy was falling. As demand fell, firms produced less, so they reduced their workforce.”

This is not entirely accurate. Demand is comprised of two components, consumption and investment. By taking a step back to 2007 it possible to see more clearly how the crisis arose. Regarding the industrialised countries as whole grouped in the OECD it is possible to see that only one of these experienced a sharp fall. This was investment not consumption.

Fig.1 below shows the level of real GDP and its key components, consumption, investment and net exports. The data is presented in both in constant prices in constant Purchasing Power Parity exchange rates and is itemised in the box below.

Read Post →

1

Tsipras versus Cameron: people versus bankers

, , Comment Closed

This article originally appeared on Socialist Economic Bulletin on the 1st of Feb 2015. 

David Cameron became the first elected politician in Europe to criticise the election of the Syriza government in Greece and was quickly followed by George Osborne. This might seem odd as Britain is outside the Eurozone and has limited direct influence over its policies. But the urgent and unrestrained nature of the criticism is very revealing about what is at stake in the anti-austerity struggle and specifically the very different roles being played by the British and Greek governments.

The Syriza government represents the popular will to end austerity. Only the parties of the left increased their vote in the recent election, and that was overwhelmingly to Syriza’s benefit with a rise of 9.4%. But entirely new parties and even parties of the traditional right adopted similar anti-austerity rhetoric in an effort to shore up their vote. The election showed the Greek popular majority wants to end austerity.

In Britain the banks have an extraordinarily large weight in the economy. Consequently, this dominance is felt through all areas of political and social life. A recent Global Financial Stability Reportfrom the IMF (pdf) demonstrated the dangerously lop-sided nature of the British economy by focusing on ‘shadow banking’, the artificially created networks of companies and vehicles to disguise the real liabilities of the banks. In Britain shadow banking accounts for over 350% of GDP. The next highest exposure of all the industrialised areas or economies is the Eurozone at less than 200% of GDP. The phrase ‘too big to fail’ is insufficiently grave to convey the threat posed by the outsized level of British bank liabilities.

This explains the sudden and intemperate Tory interventions against the newly-elected Greek government. The British government represents the interests of British big businesses and the most important of these is the banks. The banks have sharply reduced their loans outstanding to Greek borrowers. As Martin Wolf the Financial Times’ chief economics commentator explained recently, the banks in general were the key beneficiaries of the bailout, not the Greek economy or its population. Since the €254bn bailout organised by the Troika just €27bn was to support the Greek economy. The rest went to creditors with British, German and Dutch banks at the head of the queue for the taxpayer-funded bailout. But the huge debt is incurred by Greek taxpayers, and so the debt burden is unbearable.

Read Post →

Photo credit: Euronews

Syriza’s Victory: Turning Hope into Reality

, , Comment Closed

This article by Michael Burke and John Ross was originally posted on Socialist Economic Bulletin on Monday the 26th of January

The Greek people have inspired every progressive force in Europe, and beyond, by electing the first anti-austerity government in Europe. Syriza has similarly inspired every progressive person with the great political skill with which it outmanoeuvred the forces in Greece and Europe who attempted to scare the Greek people into not voting for it. As Alexis Tsipras said immediately after its victory Syriza has opened up hope for the Greek people – and many others as well.

The key question now is how to turn hope into reality.

Syriza has outlined clearly its orientation – which should be supported by every progressive force. Syriza has said it is not seeking to exit from the Euro. It wants Greece’s unpayable and unjust debt renegotiated. The immediate priority of the left throughout Europe must be to organise support for this demand of Syriza during the coming negotiations. It is to be welcomed that not only the political left but also far wider groups arguing for a rational economic policy support this course – including eminent figures in their profession such as Nobel Prize winners in economics Joseph Stiglitz and Chris Pissarides. All efforts must be redoubled across Europe to gain support for the renegotiation of Greece’s debt – a course which corresponds not only to the interests of the Greek people but to the interests of rational economic policy across Europe, and therefore to the interests of the people of Europe.

Whether or not these negotiations succeed, however, the new Greek government is faced with key choices in economic policy. This is even more the case as, if the economic policies of the new government do not succeed, sinister forces that failed to win this election will seek to turn Greece backwards.

The first and immediate priority, of course, is to reduce and eliminate the appalling humanitarian suffering imposed on the Greek people by the austerity policies. Creating jobs, raising wages, restoring pensions, recreating the best possible social security are the top priorities. As always politics must take precedence over economics.

But to sustain the improvement in the living standards of the Greek people it is necessary to relaunch economic growth. And the key to economic growth is necessarily investment. Without rising investment an economy cannot grow.

Under the conditions of Greece it is even more unrealistic than normal to rely on the private sector for investment. It is the collapse in private investment which has driven economic collapse in Greece and economic recession across Europe. Since 2007 Greece’s GDP has fallen by €57bn of which the bulk is the fall in investment at €36bn. The only way to secure economic growth is therefore to embark on a programme of state investment. Those countries which have used state investment as their key instrument to promote growth have enjoyed outstanding success – for example Ecuador, Bolivia and China.

In a country such as Ecuador, which has enjoyed 5% GDP annual average growth over 10 years, real incomes per capita have risen by over 2% a year, and 10% of the population has been lifted out of poverty. This has been driven by state investment which has now reached 15% of GDP.
Economic growth, led by state investment, will in turn create the conditions under which the private sector will begin to invest again.

Read Post →

mbT

If this is a recovery why are people getting poorer?

, , Comment Closed

On the same day that the CSO reported that the economy grow by 3.5% from a year ago, the Irish Times reported deepening gloom among households with survey respondents reporting decreasing disposable incomes. 45% of people said they were spending more on utility bills, and many others reporting increased costs of transport, healthcare and housing.

How is it both possible for the economy to be expanding at a decent clip yet the population is becoming poorer? Leaving aside the possibility that the population is expanding at a faster pace than the economy (which is not the case here), then either the data is false or all of the benefits of recovery and more are going to a minority of society. Or both.

The reality is that the CSO vastly overstate the improvement in the economy, which in reality is doing little more than bumping along the bottom. At the same time, the austerity policy works to redistribute incomes from poor to rich, from labour to capital, especially unproductive capital such as banks and landlords. If energy bills are rising in real terms incomes are being transferred to them from households. If rents are rising, real incomes are being transferred from tenants to landlords, and so on.

Fake exports, real stagnation

The export-led recovery that is so widely touted by supporters of this government and of austerity generally is a statistical fiction. Over time a number of commentators have pointed to the tax regime as a source of huge distortions to the external accounts. This facilitates the booking of costs, output and profits in this jurisdiction in order to avail of extremely low effective tax rates, way below even the headline rate of 12.5%. Constantin Gurdgiev at True Economics has also shown that this is a key factor in the current inflated level of GDP.

One marker of this distortion to the trade data is that the monthly CSO accounts show total goods exports of €23.2bn in the 3 months of Q3.  Yet the data included in the Quarterly National Accounts show exports at €27.3bn. There is a different methodology for the two pieces of data. But there is a truth gap between the real level of goods exports and reality, which has widened over time. In 2008 the export totals were almost aligned, with the GDP data showing exports just €1.8bn higher for the whole year. Now that annualised discrepancy amounts to €16.4bn. This is greater than the entire recorded improvement in real GDP since the trough of the recession at the end of 2009, which is €15.7bn. Without the fakery of an ‘export-led recovery’, statistically there is no recovery at all.

Because the export data is so distorted, it is important to consider the trends in aggregate domestic demand, which is the sum of household consumption, government consumption and investment (Gross Fixed Capital Formation).

Fig.1 Real Final Domestic Demand, €bn

MB1

Read Post →

angloshell_thumb

Low Corporation Tax Rates Do Not Boost Growth

, , Comment Closed

This article by Michael Burke originally appeared as a guest post on Notes on the Front. Michael blogs regularly on Socialist Economic Bulletin and tweets @menburke.

There are a number of reports that Ministers have travelled to the US in order to reassure investors following the closure of the ‘Double Irish’ tax loophole. It is not just highly-paid US executives who are concerned about the possible impact of changes to the corporate tax regime.

There is a widespread belief that low taxes for companies are the key to prosperity, in Ireland and in the Western economies generally. Taxes on companies have been falling in the OECD economies over a prolonged period. The corporate tax regime in Ireland is just one of the most extreme examples of this trend.

The off-setting factor has been a sharp increase in the proportion of taxes by ordinary citizens, either through income tax and social charges, or by indirect taxes on consumption (VAT, alcohol, fuel, tobacco duties and so on).

The argument is that lower corporate taxes increase the incentive and capacity of business to invest. Since investment increases productivity this would mean that lower taxes boost economic growth, create jobs and increase the quality of those jobs, including pay. The only trouble with this is that there is no evidence to support it. The evidence paints a very different picture.

According to the OECD, a weighted average of the main corporation taxes applied in its member states has fallen progressively over the last 32 years. In 1981 the average rate was 49.1%. In 2012 it was 32.4%. This was a period of the most severe economic crisis since the OECD was formed. Clearly low taxes were not proof against economic crisis. Even if we disregard the crisis itself, it is clear that GDP growth has been declining over a prolonged, which has coincided with cuts to corporation tax.

MB - Corporate Tax 1

The same is true in Ireland. The corporation tax rate was cut drastically and a 12.5% rate was phased in up to 2003. The 10-year period of GDP growth since has been the worst in the history of the state. Yet it is still widely claimed that a low rate of corporation tax determines Irish prosperity. This claim is evidently false.

The strongest ever year of Irish growth was in 1997.  This was not a part of what has become known as the ‘Celtic Tiger’ period and was six years before the 12.5% tax rate was fully phased in.

MB - Corporate Tax 2

Even when this evidence is presented, the persistence of the myth on taxation is formidable. It is argued somehow that the inclusion of the crisis years distorts the comparisons, as if the purported reason for cutting taxes was not to increase growth and prosperity. But it is also the case that average GDP growth was 4.9% in the 5 years between the cut to 12.5% rates and the crisis (2003 to 2007). This is less than half the growth rate in the in the 5 years before the rate was cut, which averaged 10.3%.

The mechanism through which lower corporate taxes is supposed to lead to increased prosperity is higher corporate investment. The argument that lower tax rates leads to higher investment has been disproved throughout the entire OECD area, which has a experienced a secular decline in both the rate of GDP growth and the rate of investment for the last 30 years.

The same is true in Ireland. Lower taxes did not lead to higher investment. The chart below shows the level of corporate taxes versus the annual growth in the rate of investment (GFCF, Gross Fixed Capital Formation). The peak period for the growth rate of investment was in the mid-to-late 1990s. This coincides with the period of strongest GDP growth, which is not coincidental as investment plays a decisive role in growth. Both of these were before the corporate tax rate was cut drastically.

MB - Corporate Tax 3

Not only did the rate of investment growth slow when corporate taxes were cut, but the composition of that investment was changed in a negative way. The chart below shows the rate of Irish corporation tax and the proportion of total investment devoted to housing. The increasing proportion of investment directed towards housing led fairly quickly to the unsustainable housing boom. The evidence is that as the tax rate fell the proportion of housing investment increased until the bubble burst. In 2004 to 2006 more than half of all investment was in housing, which was immediately after the tax rate fell to 12.5%.

Read Post →

ft_larget

Investment Remains the Key to a Real Recovery

, , Comment Closed

The Irish recession which began in the final quarter of 2007 is the most severe in the history of the state. GDP contracted by 12.1% in a little over two years ending in the 4th quarter of 2009. That slump is not over. The latest data shows that the economy still remains 3.4% below its pre-recession peak. In effect it is likely to take 5 years or more simply to recover the output that was lost in the slump.

Even then, the economy will remain way below its previous trend rate of growth. This is illustrated in Fig 1 below, which shows real GDP and real GNP from 1997 to the present. The average annual growth rate of the Irish economy from 1997 to 2007 was approximately 6%. Maintaining the trend rate of growth would have led the economy to be approximately 50% larger than it is currently, and there is a danger that this potential is lost permanently.

Fig.1 Medium-Term GDP & GNP

Fig.1 Medium-Term GDP & GNP

The causes of the slump are very clear. Over the entire period of the crisis the fall in investment more than accounts for the entirety of the decline in aggregate measures of output, either GDP or GNP. GDP in the 2nd quarter of 2014 is still €6.6bn below its late 2007 peak. Investment (Gross Fixed Capital Formation, GFCF) is €14.4bn below its peak. There are other compoents of GDP which have also failed to recover, notably personal consumption and government expenditure. But even taken together, their combined fall of €10.1bn is less than the fall in investment. The only component of GDP which has risen is net exports. The change in components of GDP is shown in Fig.2 below.

Fig.2 GDP & Components In the Slump. Source: CSO

Fig.2 GDP & Components In the Slump. Source: CSO

This data belies the notion that there is an ‘export-led recovery’ under way. Recorded net exports have grown very strongly, up €30.5bn over the period. But only one quarter of this or €7.4bn is a rise in the export of goods. A much larger statistical contribution has arisen from the decline in the imports of goods, down €14.6bn. As both investment and consumption have fallen, this simply suggests that both firms and households have been priced out of world markets by reduced purchasing power. The remainder of the rise in net exports is derived from international trade in services. These are particularly prone to the tax-induced flow of funds that plague the Irish economy and completely distort the economic data. There is little benefit from attempting to unravel them.

More importantly, it is clear that exports have not led a broad-based recovery at all. All the main domestic indicators of activity, consumption, government spending and investment are still far below their pre-recession peaks.

Read Post →

4t

Hoarding Cash While Refusing to Invest

, , Comment Closed

This article originally appeared on Socialist Economic Bulletin on the 8th of July.

The world’s largest companies are hoarding cash and cutting productive investment at the same time. The Financial Times reportsa survey from one leading ratings’ agency, Standard & Poor’s, which shows that the 2,000 largest private firms globally are sitting on a cash mountain of $4.5 trillion, which is approximately double the size of Britain’s annual GDP.

Yet capital expenditure, or ‘capex’ by those firms fell by 1% in 2013 and is projected to fall by 0.5% this year. But this does not presage an upturn. Steeper declines in productive investment are projected by those firms in both 2015 and 2016. Taken together, if these projections materialise the actual and projected falls in capex over the 4 years from 2013 to 2016 will approach the calamitous fall in productive investment seen at the depth of the recession in 2009. This is shown in the FT’s chart below.

Chart 1. Real Capital Expenditure by 2000 leading firms

1

SEB has previously argued that companies are not prevented from investing by lack of access to capital or similar factors. They are sitting on a cash mountain. The same is true of British firms. There is plenty of money left, but firms refuse to invest it.

This is because private firms are not concerned with growth, either GDP growth or the growth of their own productive capacity. They are primarily driven by the growth of their own profits, or preserving them. Where that is not possible, where new capex will not meet an expected level of return, no new investments will be made.

Read Post →