Banking

#bankinginquiry

Irish Capital and the Banking Inquiry

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The Banking inquiry is now into its main investigation. It has been hearing evidence from senior bankers and department officials, and over the next couple of months we’ll finally get to hear from the politicians themselves. To date, the focus of the inquiry has been on the night of the guarantee and this is because it is still unclear as to what actually happened that night. Witness by witness, though, we are getting closer to finding out and coming to a conclusion regarding what was by far the biggest, and most disastrous, decision taken by any Southern Irish government since partition.

The guarantee of course is not the full story. National government policy from 1990 to 2007 regardless of the political makeup prioritized commercial and residential property speculation over genuine and cohesive social development. This was coupled with a loosening of financial regulation and the promotion of the south of Ireland as a de facto tax haven.

From 2002 to 2007, Irish banks started to compete with each other for the same small pool of developers. In order to grow quickly and leapfrog each other, Irish banks got involved in widely speculative land and commercial property ventures, using international wholesale funding to do so.

The shaky foundations of the growth was exposed by the 2007-2008 credit crunch. Irish banks couldn’t get access to international loans to pay off their earlier loans and this came to a head in September 2008.

Since then, the real struggle in the crisis has been not so much over its resolution – all crises come to an end sometime – but who pays for the resolution. And in the south of Ireland, those who paid were the ordinary citizens, while those who partied walked away from their obligations. And each day of the bank inquiry this becomes clearer – those who took out mortgages did not ‘party’, but the 29 developers with debts of €32 billion between them certainly did, before using the Government to dump those debts onto our shoulders.

The relationship between these developers and Irish finance is the essential dynamic of Irish capitalism, and the banking inquiry, almost in spite of itself, is looking at this institutional framework and the manner in which it operated.

The focus on individual developers and bankers, and, more recently, Denis O’Brien and Siteserv, has obscured somewhat this structural dynamic. Systems are of course operated by and developed through people, but in order for a system to reproduce itself it needs an institutional framework.

The inquiry allows us to peer under the bonnet of Irish capitalism and get a sense of how the machine works, its internal contradictions and outputs. We are beginning to see that the indigenous troika, the one that really matters, is the Central Bank, the Department of Finance and the Department of the Taoiseach.

The main clients of this apparatus are not the citizens of the State but the indigenous banks and the IFSC. The regulatory rules, tax laws and supposed strictures and censures – all are developed and written with the needs of finance in mind.

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New Land League press conference yesterday. Photo courtesy of the Irish Times

Those Were the Days, Wha? Jerry Beades’ Old Ways Given a New [Land League] Gloss

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I would like to point out that one does not need a long memory to recall when Mr De Rossa and Mr Rabbitte were constantly using the media to get their socialist message across to the masses.

Jerry Beades 1996

Like a lot of people, I try and avoid reading media stories that have all the hallmarks of absurdity. As these stories grow, boosted by some invisible force they annoy me more because they prove difficult to ignore. You find that you have the gist of what is going on without even trying. Work colleagues discuss them in your presence, people waiting in supermarket queues rattle through the reported facts, and even sometimes, curiosity gets the better of you and in a bored moment you click a link to a seductive news headline and scan the article’s salacious content.

Then the deed is done. You’ve gone deeper than you ever indended. The mind recoils at the avoidance of facts contained in it and the framing of the story to justify the attention given to something that deserves none.

The example I am talking about is this Irish Times story about the ‘repossession‘ and Jerry Beades role in it.

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The Wrath of Kane: Banking Crisis and Political Power

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While his whole testimony requires examining in a little more depth, I think this is a good standalone clip from evidence to the banking inquiry given by Prof. Ed Kane on Wednesday 28 Jan 2015.

He was asked by Deputy Pearse Doherty to elaborate on the statement below which was made in a paper that Kane co-authored in 2004:

Realistically, every government-managed disaster relief program is a strongly lobbied tax-transfer program for redistributing wealth and shifting risk away from the disaster’s immediate victims. A systemic crisis externalizes – in depositor runs and in bank and borrower pleas for government assistance – a political and economic struggle over when and how losses accumulated in corporate balance sheets and in the risky portfolios of insolvent financial institutions are to be unwound and reallocated across society.

Professor Kane’s analysis is that the way a crisis plays out in terms of who pays for the crisis is an issue of power – that is, it is related to the nature of political and economic power in a state and the relationships between the worlds of finance and politics.

Anyway, the official transcript is below, with a video clip of the ecxhange. You’ll notice that the official transcript differs slightly from the actual exchange, but not in a significant way. The meaning is still captured and essentially stays the same.

the 2004 paper referenced is available here.

Deputy Pearse Doherty: [your] 2004 paper says that while policy-making during a crisis may be of the seat of the pants variety, the policy itself is informed by a political and economic struggle over who pays for the losses. How important in the view of Professor Kane is that dynamic, namely, the political and economic struggle of who pays for the crisis in terms of framing the terms of the resolution?

Professor Edward Kane: I think it is terribly important. I define a crisis as a battle over loss allocation. There are firms with losses and no one wants to hold them. People are contracted to take the losses, by writing insurance or lending money or bonds, but they do not want to pay and they have the political power, in many cases, to see that they are paid. My superficial understanding of Ireland is that many foreign creditors were paid off with Irish taxpayers’ money and it is astonishing to me how good politics, the way a republic or a democracy is supposed to work, would ever lead to that solution.

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Debt? What Debt?

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With the Dail to debate a private members motion from Catherine Murphy, TD calling for support for a European Debt Conference, it is worth looking over Ireland’s debt numbers; especially as we will get a flood of claims from some quarters that our debt level is fine, its’ sustainable, we don’t need debt relief, etc. etc. etc.

The starting point in such debates is the question:  is Irish debt sustainable.  This can, however, descend into a black hole of formulae.  Simply put, just about any debt can be considered ‘sustainable’ if the debtor is willing to starve the kids and live under the railway bridge.  ‘Sustainable?  Sure, but there will be sacrifices’ (which, in Ireland are never inventoried).  If you believe this is an exaggeration, consider the EU elite’s attitude towards Greek debt levels. 

Let’s go through some bald numbers.

Debt 1

Irish debt is among the highest in the 19 Eurozone countries.  Officially, it is at 110 percent of GDP; when measured against our fiscal capacity as suggested by the Fiscal Council, it rises to 122 percent.  We’re placed fourth though look out for Cyprus and Belgium in the next few years.

When we turn to what some call an ‘illegitimate’ debt – that private banking debt that we all ended up paying for – Ireland remains league leader.

Debt 2

While banking debt makes up a quarter of our GDP, in the Eurozone the total debt is less than 2 percent.  And for Ireland, this doesn’t count the nearly €20 billion taken from the National Pension Reserve Fund for recapitalisation – since this is categorised ‘investment’ and not debt.   Were it not for the official banking debt, our overall levels would be close to the average Eurozone level. 

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Always the Artists: Week Three of the Bank Inquiry

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“Shadows never go away.
Might be you don’t see them,
but they’re always clinging to your heels.”

A Song of Ice and Fire

When I was a child in primary school my way of dealing with Irish class was to find a word in the question that matched a word in the text and hope for the best. The sentence I would find would be the one I’d read out. Sometimes it worked, sometimes it didn’t. But, it was a plan, and it helped me get through the hour.

In the absence of any understanding of the grammar, of the way the words actually relate to each other, you grab what you can and try to make sense of the situation.

In terms of the bank guarantee and bailout, and the different narratives that are being thrown out there, we can’t really do this – we can’t just pick out single words, single events, and use them to make our story. We need to have enough of an overview of the dynamics at play in order to make sure we don’t stray from the path as we go forward.

In other words, we need to understand the grammar that holds it all together, and one of the objectives of the bank inquiry is to fulfill this role.

It helps, of course, to have witnesses that understand this, and with Professor Patrick Honohan last week I’m not sure it did.

On paper the purpose of Honohan’s appearance before the Bank Inquiry Committee was to discuss his 2010 report, which looked at the regulatory and operational failure within the Central Bank and the Financial Regulator’s office. On the day itself, however, the proceedings were dominated by talk of the 2008 bank guarantee – the decision itself and supposed cost.

Honohan initially said that the net cost of the guarantee would be somewhere in the region of €40 billion. When he was challenged on this he revised the figure and, indeed, the parameters, acknowledging that his figure wasn’t for the guarantee alone but for the subsequent bailout. Even with this, Honohan had not factored in added costs such as interest repayments. The moment he gave the definitive-sounding figure of €40bn, though, he had handed the journalists the following day’s headline.

He followed his €40bn with another brash statement – that Brian Lenihan had been ‘overruled’ by a more senior politician with regard to saving Anglo Irish Bank. It was obvious that the ‘more senior politician’ he was referring to was Brian Cowen.

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Peter Nyberg Bank Inquiry Evidence, 17 December 2014

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I do not think it is fair to say people partied. People just lived a little better than they otherwise would have done because of the bubble.” Peter Nyberg under questioning from Deputy Pearse Doherty, 17 Dec 2014.

Peter Nyberg’s appearance at the Irish bank inquiry marked the beginning of the context phase, the purpose of which is to set the scene for the causes and consequences of the bank guarantee and bailout. The context part is going to last for a few months, and it may not be until April before the committee starts calling people actually involved in the guarantee decision and its aftermath. So, for those looking for fireworks you may have to be a little bit patient I’m afraid. However, the context phase gives us the opportunity to do what it says – to place the guarantee within a wider framework than that of the personalities involved in the tense meetings of the night of 29 September 2008. It allows us to see the bigger picture; that is, if we want to see it. It is by no means certain that such a road is one that the various actors involved in Irish finance would choose for themselves. Alongside this, the committee is itself working within a context where narratives around the crisis have already been formed, most notably the “asleep at the wheel/regulators/bad apples/nobody understood/auditors/collective psychology” theme. I’ll come back to this later as this is something that popped up during Nyberg’s (quite dry and uninspiring) testimony, but it is worth flagging now because in the search for the truth as to what happened we have to deal with a story that has had six years to bed itself down. The analogy that is closest to explaining what I’m getting at here would be that of a cover story, but it is not as calculated and Machiavellian as that. We’re dealing here with an ideology – Nyberg admits as much in his testimony – and the way that the ideology of modern finance made sense of the world before the crash is the way that it made sense of the world after the crash. It couldn’t grasp the nature of the problem then, and it is incapable of making sense of it now. It knows that the problem was structural, but because it has such a vested interest in the continuation of those structures and practices, it has to find a way of addressing systemic failure without changing the architecture. Its solution, its way of squaring the circle, is to treat the crisis as a managerial problem. Asleep at the wheel / regulators / bad apples / nobody understood / auditors / collective psychology / etc etc etc. What is needed is better managers, better regulators, better auditors. It is a bit like if a car crashes because of faulty brakes, the solution is to find a better driver.

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For Some Vicious Mole of Nature: Making Sense of The Irish Bank Crisis

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God will forgive them.
He’ll forgive them and allow them into Heaven.
I can’t live with that.”

Dead Man’s Shoes (2004)

What are we to make of the Irish Banking Inquiry, which began its public hearings last week. For myself, as I said in Shop Floor in September, I think it provides an opportunity for progressives and we should make use of it.

As to what I mean by that, well, take this quote from a 2012 paper by Gregory Connor, Thomas Flavin and Brian O’Kelly, entitled ‘The U.S. and Irish credit crises: Their distinctive differences and common features’, published in the Journal of International Money and Finance (available as a pdf here).

It is not clear that Anglo Irish Bank represented a systemic risk. Anglo Irish had a limited retail presence; it operated by making large-scale commercial loans funded by institutional borrowing. Other banks may have wanted Anglo Irish included in the government support schemes since, as was subsequently revealed, many developer loans with different banks were secured with the same collateral, creating a complex web that would be difficult and costly to unwind if Anglo Irish alone were allowed to fail.” (Connor et.al. 2012: 63)

The key to the Irish bank guarantee and subsequent sovereign debt crisis is right there in that complex web of developer loans with different banks. That’s the rabbit hole, the one we need to fall into, in order to make sense of this whole mess.

But let us be clear: although the loan book is key, this is not just about developers and their bets.

For example, the loans for commercial property speculation cannot be separated from the tax incentives approved by the Oireachtas and various finance ministers; nor from the legislative and regulatory environment that finance and property speculation demanded of, and received from, the Irish State.

Alongside the finance/speculator/state core lie the professional sectors that benefited hugely from this environment – that is, accountancy, law and real estate.

There is also the issue of the media in Ireland – private and public, the newspapers as well as RTE – which as a sector not only benefited from property speculation via ad revenue, but at a deeper level shared (and continues to share) much of the ideological framework which gave an intellectual sheen to such base and futile speculation.

When we take these dynamics and place them within a historical time-frame, we start to observe a reconfiguration of the Irish State, from the late 1960s to the mid-1990s, which parallels the shift in profit-seeking strategies within Western capital, from production to rentier. Ireland’s role as a comprador state, that stays the same, albeit one that shifts from the grazing fields of Meath to the glass towers of the docklands.

The best way to make sense of a ‘complex web’ of social, political, economic and cultural forces is to apply a relational approach, not a causal one.

A world seen through causality is binary, whereas a relational approach is dynamic – it allows us to see the various forces in motion, bouncing off each other, as they create new tensions and contradictions.

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The Dangers of Exaggerating RMB Internationalisation

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RMB ‘internationalization’ is one of the most discussed issues in China’s economic policy. But many claims regarding the extent of RMB internationalization are greatly exaggerated and the practical proposal to attempt to achieve it, capital account convertibility of the RMB, is extremely dangerous for China’s economic and social stability. To eliminate false estimates and policies, it is, therefore, necessary first to accurately establish the facts regarding the real international role of the RMB and then analyze what consequences flow from these.

Those wishing to present a highly exaggerated picture of the degree of RMB internationalization frequently do this by presenting percentage growth figures. This gives a misleading impression because it fails to mention that such growth rates look impressive merely because they are calculated starting from extraordinarily low levels. To take a typical example, the proportion of RMB payments carried out in the US in April 2014 had risen by 100% compared to a year earlier. This sounds spectacular – until it is noted that the rise was only to 0.04% of all worldwide currency transactions!

A sense of reality is immediately injected if its noted that in April 2014 the RMB accounted for only 1.4% of international payments – globally, RMB payments are entirely marginal. Furthermore even this very low figure exaggerates the RMB’s internationalization because a large percentage of the payments are merely between mainland China and Hong Kong.

To illustrate the real situation, start with China’s strongest area internationally – trade. By the end of 2013, 8.7% of world trade was denominated in RMB – but the dollar’s share was almost 10 times as high at 81%. Furthermore, the RMB figure was artificially flattering as around 80% of RMB payments were for Hong Kong. Excluding Hong Kong RMB payments were marginal. For example, by April 2014 only 2.4% of China and Hong Kong’s trade with the US, China’s largest single country export market, was in RMB.

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Anglo: Not Our Debt Campaigners Alarmed at ECB Pressure

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Debt Justice Action – a coalition of community, trade union, global justice, academic, faith-based and other groups that hosts the Anglo: Not Our Debt Campaign –  has described as “alarming” media reports that the Irish government is being pressured by the European Central Bank to quickly sell on to the private sector the government bonds it issued to replace the Anglo promissory notes in 2013.

Spokesperson Niamh McCrea said that any such sale would “make an already bad deal even worse”.  She said, “The debts run up by a bank like Anglo, which is under criminal investigation, should never have been taken on by the Irish people through the promissory notes, and those notes should not have been turned into sovereign debt, as the government did last year, extending the repayment period but with no write-down of the debt”.

Andy Storey pointed out that as the bonds are currently held by the Central Bank of Ireland, any interest paid on them stays with the Irish state, but that “if they are sold to the private sector, as the ECB is now pushing to happen quickly, then the same class of creditors and bondholders whose gambles were made good by the Irish government will end up making yet more money by raking in the interest payments due”.

Ms McCrea called on the Irish government to “for once, resist ECB pressure and insist that the bonds remain with the Central Bank with a view to negotiating the write-down of this odious and illegitimate debt”.

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Irelands’ Bank Guarantee: A Lesson In Class Power

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The following article by Conor McCabe, is taken from the first issue of the relaunched The Bottom Dog, published by the Limerick Council of Trade Unions. Copies of the full print issue are now available in Connolly Books. You can also follow The Bottom Dog on Facebook.  

At the start of 2013 the indepen­dent TD for Wicklow, Stephen Don­nelly, stood up in the Dáil and ta­lked about the bank guarantee. He said it was passed because ‘of a di­ktat from Europe that said no Euro­pean bank could fail, no Eurozone bank could fail and no senior bond­holders could incur any debt.’ It is a curious opinion to hold, as the on­ly foreign accents heard on the re­cently-released Anglo tapes are imitations done by Irish bankers of considerable wealth and influence.

The tapes shone a light on the short-term focus, the scramble for capital that was to the front of the bank’s management team. John Bowe, the head of Capital Markets at Anglo Irish Bank, told his collea­gue Peter Fitzgerald that the strate­gy was to get the Irish central bank to commit itself to funding Anglo, to ‘get them to write a big cheque.’ By doing so, the Central Bank wo­uld find itself locked in to Anglo as it would have to shore up the bank to ensure it got repaid.

The Irish financial regulator, Pat Ne­ary, in a conversation with Bowe, said that Anglo was asking his offi­ce ‘to play ducks and drakes wi­th the regulations.’ Once the gua­rantee was passed the bank’s CEO, David Drumm, told his executives to take full advantage but advised them to be careful and not to get caught.

This was reinforced by an article in the Sunday Independent on 17 No­vember 2013 which looked to the British Treasury’s archives for in­formation on Anglo and the bank guarantee. ‘The documents reve­al’ said the newspaper, ‘that the Fi­nancial Regulator tipped off Britain that Anglo might be “unable to roll €3bn [in funding] overnight,” but not to worry as if that happened the Central Bank or Government would step in to bail it out.’

The idea for a blanket guarantee, however, did not originate entirely with the Anglo management team, regardless of how much they em­braced it. In the weeks leading up to the decision, the idea of a gu­arantee was flagged in the natio­nal media by people such as David McWilliams and the property deve­loper Noel Smyth.

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Friday Stat Attack: The Financial Heaven that is Ireland

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When we think of profits, we think of successful companies that employ people to produce goods and services that other people want to buy; for instance, the proverbial ‘widget’ factory.  Ideally, a profitable company employs people on good wages and conditions, invests in expansion (to keep up those profits and increase market share), and pays a competitive return on capital.

With the onset of financialisation, financial companies have come to over-ride traditional markets such as industry.  They don’t actually produce much, but they make a lot of money and with that comes political power to dominate decision-making in the economy.  If you have any doubts about that just remember our own bubble, crash and bondholder rescue.  The productive economy takes second place.

One measure of the extent to which financial institutions can dominate the productive economy is to compare profit levels between the two.  In a productive economy, profits from non-financial companies should be strong.  In a financialised economy, profits from financial institutions will be stronger.

Where does the Irish economy stand?  With the financial boys and girls.

financialprofits

Yes, if you’re a financial company and you happen to be in Ireland, you’re in heaven.  Even the UK, with the power of The City, doesn’t match Ireland in this measurement.

Yes, some people might say, but financial companies bring their own benefit to the economy.  Oh?  Not according to the latest Central Bank Quarterly Report – thanks to Ben (aka Conor McCabe) from Dublin Opinion for spotting this:

‘Financial sector developments, which are for the most part unrelated to the domestic economy, account for a significant portion of the rise in GNP. To the extent that these persist in contributing to growth in net factor income in the coming year, they would further support GNP growth unrelated to domestic consumption, investment or export activity.’

Ah, yes, they are in this economy but not of this economy.

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A Union for Big Banks

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This report was originally published on the Corporate Europe Observatory website today, the 24th of January 2014.

Far from being a solution to avoid future public bailouts and austerity, Europe’s new banking union rules look like a victory for the financial sector to continue business as usual.

In late 2013, the EU took a major step towards a “banking union”. This has been presented as a series of measures in response to the financial crisis to avoid a repeat of the vision of contagious risk and bailed out banks.  In the preceding months a “single rule book” for banks and a European-wide system of supervision had been adopted. Finally in December a set of rules on a common regime of “resolution” (winding up) of ailing banks was agreed, and the European Council decided its version of rules on how to manage the question of the costs of resolution.

EU Single Market Commissioner Michel Barnier was a happy man:

“Today is a momentous day for banking union. A memorable day for Europe’s financial sector… We are introducing revolutionary changes to Europe’s financial sector… I have now delivered 28 proposals to better regulate, supervise, and govern the financial sector and a more integrated, less fragmented single market. So that taxpayers no longer foot the bill when banks make mistakes. Ending the era of massive bail-outs.”1

These bold promises are bound to be received well by the public in most parts of Europe. With the financial crisis, member states took over massive debts originated in the financial sector to save banks. Four and a half trillion euros had been risked for bailouts – and the final bill was 1,7 trillion euro. Not only did this send national economies spiralling downwards and set off a public debt crisis, it also led to a regime of harsh austerity policies, imposed by the EU institutions and the IMF as conditions for loans.

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An Open Letter to Minister Shatter

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This open letter was originally published on Project Allende on the 9th of December 2013.

On Monday this week I received a surprise email from The Minister for Justice, Equality and Defence. Signed “Best Wishes, Alan”, minister Shatter’s email was no Christmas greeting. It acknowledged a November online Contact.ie campaign to “Destroy the Anglo Bonds” in which I had participated along with an estimated 100,000 others.

The timing of Alan’s missal was unorthodox, as the vote had already taken place, the other emails I had received from TDs were in favour of the motion and had been sent before the debate. None of these were from any of the three major parties. In contrast to Alan’s letter they were strongly in favour of removing the Anglo ‘socialised’ debt, first created by Fianna Fáil as promissory notes, then consecrated by Fine Gael & Labour into sovereign bonds.

I can only surmise that Alan felt a need to explain himself.

This ‘debt’, as every Irish person knows, was the result of a disastrous public rescue of Anglo Irish Bank, the bank that The British Independent Commission on Banking called “the worst bank in Europe”. Internationally Anglo is a case study in the corruption of the European banking sector. To Alan it was an unsightly legacy from Fianna Fáil. Had Alan not listened to the Anglo Tapes? Maybe not.

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Labour Throws 30,000 Unemployed and Low-Paid Mortgage Holders to the Wolves!

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Statement from Seamus Healy TD 087-2802199

There is a special category of up to 30,000 low-income distressed mortgage holders who do not have sufficient income to enable them to avail of the personal insolvency procedure put in place by the government.

Labour has abandoned them to repossession and eviction. The Irish people have a long history of resisting evictions. Workers and Unemployed Action, in accordance with this noble tradition, will support these families in resisting repossessions and evictions.

On December 3, at Leaders Questions in the Dáil, I asked the Tánaiste and Labour Party Leader, Eamonn Gilmore, the following questions:

(1) Last week the Taoiseach refused to answer my question on the issue but he repeatedly stated that there is a solution for everyone in mortgage distress. Does the Tánaiste regard bankruptcy and repossession of the family home as a solution for those blameless families? Is that the reason the Government removed the legal ban on repossessions? One could ask whether that is the reason the indefensible situation has arisen whereby the Government has allowed the Central Bank to reduce the moratorium on repossessions from 12 months to two months. Will the Government ensure that the families which have fully engaged and have modest mortgages that are not buy-to-let properties, who are not strategic defaulters – will the Tánaiste ensure that these families will be allowed to remain in their homes?

(2) The Icelandic Government announced today that it will defy the banks by writing off up to €24,000 of household mortgages. Iceland obviously has real sovereignty. Will the Government exercise sovereignty by preventing reckless bailed-out banks, some owned by international vulture capitalists, from evicting 30,000 families in this country?

Mr Gilmore did not answer either question but continued to assert that these families do not face repossession despite the evidence. He expressed meaningless wishes such as: “We want every family and householder in mortgage difficulty to have that difficulty resolved and to avoid up losing their home” He said that each distressed mortgage would have to be dealt with “on a case by case basis”. He is clearly refusing to take any action to protect this special category of low income mortgage holders. His “case by case basis” places the individual mortgage holder at the tender mercy of the banks.

My question was based on a Report by the company Grant Thornton Debt Solutions which showed that thousands of distressed mortgage holders, unemployed or lowly paid, did not have sufficient income to avail of the Personal Insolvency procedure put in place by the government. This is because their income is below the minimum permitted living expenses for their household and consequently have no money to give to the bank each month. An interview with Michael McAteer, senior partner with Grant Thornton, can be heard by clicking here.

Mr McAteer makes clear that the only option for these low income families is to seek bankruptcy. Under bankruptcy law, which has recently been revised, ownership of all assets of the bankrupt person including the family home are transferred to the Official Assignee for the benefit of the creditors (the bank). In the last 12 months, Mr Gilmore’s government has removed the absolute ban on repossession of the family home. The Government has also reduced the one year delay before a bank can take legal action for repossession against a person who can’t pay a mortgage to a mere two months.

Mr Gilmore and the Labour Party have removed the protections for unemployed and low income distressed mortgage holders. They are clearly on the side of the banks.

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